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Abstract. This paper uses propensity score matching to evaluate the effectiveness of CONAFE, a 
compensatory education program in Mexico, in improving student test scores and lowering repetition and 
failure rates. We find that CONAFE is most effective in improving primary school math learning and 
secondary school Spanish learning. Telesecundaria  education and bilingual education for indigenous 
students are both shown to improve student achievement. CONAFE also lowers primary school repetition 
and failure rates. We conclude that this compensatory education program can effectively improve short-
term learning results for disadvantaged students, but that improvement varies by the subject of instruction 
and the demographic of student taught.  
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The President of Mexico, Vicente Fox, proclaimed in 2001 that his top education priority 
was the provision of equal and high-quality education to all Mexicans—a sentiment that 
reaffirmed the commitments of earlier Mexican administrations (Secretaría de Educación Pública 
2001). But effectively and cost-effectively educating all citizens is difficult in a geographically 
disperse and culturally heterogeneous country like Mexico. How should Mexico educate the type 
of students who speak no Spanish, live in villages inaccessible by roads, or come from families 
that cannot afford school uniforms? 
  A similar question should concern education policymakers in most poor- and middle-
income countries. High-quality basic education is necessary to end the transmission of poverty 
from one disadvantaged generation to the next. Health and infrastructure improvements can build 
a framework for every person to live a life free of poverty. But if a country’s most disadvantaged 
students do not receive a high-quality education, those students will be largely unable to escape 
the intractable and abject poverty that characterizes too many disadvantaged communities. 
  Mexico began to address this challenge as early as 1971 by creating the National Council 
of Education Promotion (CONAFE), a division of Mexico’s Secretariat of Public Education 
(SEP). CONAFE provides extra resources to schools that enroll disadvantaged students. 
CONAFE’s compensatory education programs now support about four million students in 
preschool and primary education, and about 300,000 students in telesecundaria education 
(secondary education delivered via television to remote communities).
2  
The present document studies the effectiveness of CONAFE in improving basic 
education for Mexico’s most disadvantaged students. While our analysis should particularly 
                                                 
2 Current numbers based on 1998 projections.   3
interest researchers and policymakers who study Mexican education, it should also concern 
education researchers generally as a case study of how a country can effectively improve the 
learning outcomes of disadvantaged students. One might think that a country’s worst-performing 
schools lack the necessary bureaucratic and physical infrastructure to effectively use extra 
resources, so providing extra resources to severely disadvantaged schools would cause little 
impact on student learning outcomes. This paper profiles one case where extra resources appear 
to have measurable impact on student learning, though the unique features of the CONAFE 




CONAFE compensates for the early disadvantages of some students by providing extra 
resources to the schools enrolling those students. In this regard, it is a program of compensatory 
education, and its model resembles compensatory education elsewhere. An array of economic 
literature has attempted to evaluate compensatory education outside Mexico. 
Among the largest compensatory education programs is Chapter 1 (formerly Title 1) in 
the U.S., which in 1991 allocated $4.3 billion to schools enrolling low-income students. A 
variety of evaluations in the 1980s found that Chapter 1 effectively increased test scores over a 
1-year period, but that scores fell in the summer or year following the investment of Chapter 1 
(Slavin 1989).  
More recent research has focused on the Head Start program in the U.S., which provides 
extra resources to disadvantaged preschool students. Head Start began in 1965 by giving $1,000 
(in 1999 prices) per student to about 500,00 children aged three and four; today it supports about   4
800,000 students with about $5,400 per student (Garces et al. 2002). Analyses of the program 
show that Head Start increases test scores, lowers dropout and failure rates, and shrinks test score 
inequality between ethnic groups (Currie and Neidell 2003, Currie and Thomas 1999, Barnett 
1995, and Karly et al. 1998). By third grade, however, the effects of Head Start seem to 
disappear (Currie and Thomas 2000, Aughinbaugh 2001; also see Barnett 1995 and Karly et al. 
1998 for review of this literature). More recent analysis by Garces et al. (2002) has shown that 
adults who participated in Head Start as children were not more likely to complete high school, 
attend college, or have higher earnings than students who did not participate in Head Start. One 
suggested conclusion of this research is that in order achieve long-term effectiveness, 
compensatory education must be sustained over long time periods (Aughinbaugh 2001). 
Chile operates a program called P-900 that resembles CONAFE. Chile’s Ministry of 
Education provides teacher training, textbooks and didactic materials, and infrastructure 
improvements to the schools with the worst performance on a national exam of student ability. 
Some recent analyses (MINEDUC 2000, Tokman 2002) compare performance of students in P-
900 schools against students outside such schools. They find that P-900 increases test score 
performance over several years, but no analyses examine the effectiveness of P-900 in increasing 
school participation through the university level or in increasing wages through adulthood. 
CONAFE’s compensatory programs do not operate schools, but rather give extra support 
to all indigenous, some secondary, and selected other rural schools.
3 For schools that enroll 
indigenous students, CONAFE supports development of curricula, didactic materials, and 
textbooks in an indigenous language and Spanish to facilitate bilingual education. CONAFE also 
                                                 
3 CONAFE does operate a community education program that leads instruction in highly isolated areas. Since we 
only examine CONAFE’s compensatory programs, subsequent mention of “CONAFE” refers only to CONAFE’s 
compensatory programs unless otherwise noted. 
   5
supports the development of intercultural education for indigenous students—CONAFE 
develops curricula that include elements from both Mexico’s mixed mestizo heritage and from 
indigenous cultures, and those curricula emphasize relationships between mestizo and indigenous 
culture. For disadvantaged rural schools, CONAFE provides updated audiovisual technology, 
professional development of teachers, improvements to school infrastructure, and other 
interventions designed to improve the learning outcomes of disadvantaged Mexican students. For 
telesecundaria education, CONAFE provides audiovisual materials and infrastructure 
improvements to all schools. In the telesecundaria schools that CONAFE supports, a single 
teacher coordinates and facilitates all subjects in a rural school that receives recorded lectures 
from Mexico City using a national satellite television system. In most CONAFE schools, a group 
of community parents and leaders (AGEs) receives a grant that can be spent on whatever 
educational purposes the group selects. The involvement of local decision-making may increase 
the effectiveness of spending; it may also increase parental involvement in and commitment to 
their students’ learning. For simplicity, we will describe schools and students that receive 
support from CONAFE as CONAFE schools and CONAFE students. 
A targeting index selects which schools receive CONAFE support. Indigenous peoples in 
Mexico are sufficiently segregated and distant from even under-developed urban areas that 
separate schools exist for indigenous students. Most indigenous schools and telesecundarias 
receive CONAFE’s support. CONAFE selects other schools for support based on the average 
income of the school’s community, the school’s isolation and access to public infrastructure, the 
school’s education indicators and other indicators of poverty. 
In the last 15 years, CONAFE has received substantial funding from international 
agencies. The World Bank’s Basic Education Loan (PAREIB, 1998-2006) provides a nominal   6
total of $625 million to support CONAFE. The World Bank operated several similar loans 
between 1991 and 1998. The Inter-American Development Bank has operated the Integrated 
Program to Abate Educational Underachievement (PIARE) and the Distance Education Program. 
These loans provided a nominal total of nearly two billion dollars between 1991 and 2003 (Table 
1).  
 
Table 1. International Financial Support for CONAFE 
Project name  Years  Amount  Details 
First Primary Education 
Project  (PARE) 
1991-
1997 
$250  World Bank. Supported compensatory programs 
for primary education in the four Mexican states 
with the highest incidence of poverty. 





4  World Bank. Supported human resource 
development of educators; educational materials, 






$393  Inter-American Development Bank. Supported 
CONAFE’s Compensatory Programs in the 17 






$412  World Bank. Supported compensatory education 











$625  World Bank. Supports basic compensatory 




2003-  $420  Inter-American Development Bank. Supported 
CONAFE’s Community Education Programs in 
all Mexican states. 
Amounts are in nominal US$ million. Sources: World Bank 1991, World Bank 1994, Inter-American Development 
Bank 1997, World Bank 1997, World Bank 1998, World Bank 2002, Inter-American Development Bank 2003. 
 
That international funding supports a relatively low-cost program. CONAFE’s real costs 
have grown in the last decade, and CONAFE’s compensatory programs now cost just over $50 
per student per year. Those costs compare to a typical cost of  $527 per telesecundaria student 
and $477 per general middle school student (Castro, Wolff and García 2001) (See Table 2).   
                                                 
4 Originally $80m, but in 1995, $6m of the loan was canceled due to Peso devaluation.   7
 
Table 2. The Cost of CONAFE Students, 1994-2002 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real  Cost  $17 $25 $41 $40 $45 $48 $51 $48 $51 
Annual 
Growth (%) 
  0.49 0.66 -0.02 0.11 0.07 0.06 -0.04  0.06 
Note: Costs are per Mexican student, in 2002 U.S. Dollars, using an exchange rate of 0.103MXP = US$1. 
Source: CONAFE data. Costs deflated by Banco de México’s Consumer Price Index. 
 
The World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) support CONAFE 
based on the argument that CONAFE improves the educational outcomes of Mexico’s most 
disadvantaged students. A variety of previous evaluations have examined the effectiveness of 
CONAFE with some or no control group construction, and they have generally found that 
CONAFE improves short-term educational outcomes. A World Bank (2002) evaluation 
compared CONAFE-supported schools between the years 1992 and 1995 with comparable 
schools in the Mexican state of Michoacan that at the time received no CONAFE support. That 
evaluation found that CONAFE significantly increased test scores of indigenous and other rural 
students. CONAFE appeared to increase the test scores of indigenous students by 25 percent 
over the four-year period, and CONAFE appeared to increase rural non-indigenous test scores by 
12 percent over the period. The evaluation concluded that full implementation of CONAFE 
could cause indigenous student performance increases of 45 percent to 90 percent, and rural 
school performance increases of 19 percent to 38 percent. 
A separate World Bank (2002) evaluation summarized in the same document found that 
CONAFE’s support significantly benefited the one million indigenous primary school students in 
CONAFE schools. The report found that indigenous students supported by CONAFE were 
catching up to their non-indigenous peers in test scores by about 10 percent per year. The 
evaluation did not control for relevant differences in background between indigenous and non-  8
indigenous students. An additional IDB-sponsored evaluation found that telesecundaria schools 
were effective in increasing math and language test scores. The report found that telesecundarias 
entirely eliminated the math performance gap between telesecundaria and non-telesecundaria 
students, though telesecundaria education was not as effective in Spanish instruction (Castro, 
Wolff and García 2001). 
An additional evaluation by Paqueo and Lopez-Acevedo (2003) studied the effect of 
CONAFE support on rural and indigenous children using a production function, measuring 
performance by sixth grade Spanish test scores. The study found that CONAFE improved 
learning outcomes for poor students, but that it appeared to have no distinct effect for indigenous 
poor students. 
 
Modeling Background and Achievement 
Prior evaluations imperfectly measure CONAFE’s effect because student socio-economic 
backgrounds differ markedly between CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools. For example, 
practically all indigenous students attend CONAFE schools, so one cannot determine the effect 
of CONAFE on indigenous students by looking at only indigenous students—one would have no 
appropriate group against which to compare those students. Construction of a control group of 
non-indigenous students, however, is difficult—indigenous students are more disadvantaged than 
their non-indigenous peers, and indigenous students may lack Spanish as a mother tongue. So we 
seek to develop a model that can use available data on student test scores, CONAFE support, and 
student background to distinguish the effect of CONAFE on student achievement from the effect 
of student background on student achievement.   9
We first consider the probability P that the school of a student i received CONAFE 
support in year k, representing CONAFE support as cik=1. That probability depends on a function 
f of the background characteristics X of the student and the student’s community such as 
availability of public services, average literacy and average income: 
) ( ) 1 ( ik ik X f c P = =   (1.0)
Although CONAFE supports a school and not a single student, we model CONAFE support as a 
function of both student and community background. Since CONAFE selects schools by the 
average disadvantage of the students attending that school and the community in which the 
school is located, equation (1.0) accurately models CONAFE’s targeting. 
Then for two students 1 and 2 of comparable backgrounds and similar communities, by 
equation (1.0), the probabilities that either student’s school receives CONAFE support in year k 
are equal: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 = = = ⇒ = k k k k c P c P X f X f   (1.1)
 
We further assume that the educational achievement θ of a student in the year k1 is a 
function g of the background of both the student and student’s community and the presence c of 
CONAFE support in the prior year k0:  
) , (
0 1 1 ik ik ik c X g = θ   (2.0)
In reality, school and teacher quality significantly affect student learning. School quality, 
however, is likely to closely correlate with student and community background. Since the best 
measure of school quality, θ, is the outcome we are trying to predict, we assume that the 
information in X captures information about school quality, and we include no school or teacher 
quality indicator in equation (2.0). We should emphasize that CONAFE support requires at least 
one time period to be effective, so c in time period k0 affects θ  in time k1.   10
So two students 1 and 2 with similar backgrounds in time period k1 and whose schools 
either both or neither received CONAFE support in time period k0 should demonstrate the same 
educational achievement: 
1 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 k k k k k k c c X X θ θ = ⇒ = ∪ =   (2.1)
 
Similarly, if two students have similar backgrounds but one student’s school receives CONAFE 
support and the other student’s school does not, the effect ∆ of CONAFE’s support in time k0 on 
student achievement in time k1 equals the difference in achievement of the students in time k1. 
∆ = − ⇒ = ∪ = ∪ =
1 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 ) 0 1 ( k k k k k k c c X X θ θ   (2.2)
 
Thus, to measure the effect of CONAFE’s support on student achievement, we should compare 
students with similar background characteristics but where one student receives CONAFE 
support and the other does not. Although the students may show similar performance at first, we 
hypothesize that each year of CONAFE support should improve the performance of CONAFE 
students by ∆. In sum, CONAFE’s effect in one year can be measured as the difference in score 
increases demonstrated by students of comparable backgrounds, only one of whom received 
CONAFE support in the prior year. 
  In reality, CONAFE’s effect likely compounds or decreases over time, and a simple one-
period model does not show CONAFE’s true long-run effect. Our data, however, cover a span of 
five school years for primary school and three school years for secondary school, and we are 
unable to determine when most schools in the sample began receiving CONAFE support. Thus, 
we limit our model to a simple one-period comparison and emphasize the caveat that CONAFE’s 
effects may in reality compound or decrease over time.   11
Methodology 
To identify students with similar backgrounds, we use a propensity score matching 
algorithm that identifies comparable CONAFE and non-CONAFE students. Propensity score 
matching was first advanced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and is becoming more common in 
evaluations of targeted anti-poverty programs (see, for example, Pradhan and Rawlings 2002; 
Newman et al 2002; Park, Wang and Wu 2002; and Jalan and Ravallion 2003). Matching is 
particularly appropriate to evaluate cases where (a) some observations received an experimental 
treatment, (b) selection of observations for treatment was non-random and based on background 
features of each observation, (c) few observations in the non-experimental group have similar 
characteristics to observations in the experimental group, and (d) selecting comparable 
experimental and non-experimental observations is difficult due to the high number of 
background features needed to determine comparability (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). CONAFE’s 
support is non-random and heavily based on complex background characteristics of students and 
schools, so evaluation of CONAFE is a good case for the matching evaluation. 
An unbiased propensity score match would use sufficient background information of 
students to ensure that the assignment of CONAFE support among students with equal 
propensity scores is purely random (Becker and Ichino 2002). Unfortunately, limited background 
data available to do this match suggests that negative score bias towards CONAFE students 
remains in our methodology, meaning that CONAFE students must overcome extra obstacles to 
show the same achievement as non-CONAFE students.   
A propensity score (p-score) is the probability, given a school’s background, that the 
school receives CONAFE support. A p-score could more simply be interpreted as the 
correspondence of a school’s background with the profile of a typical CONAFE school.    12
  Our scoring methodology was based on Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and consists of five 
steps that the following pages explain in detail. First, we selected background variables to use in 
comparing students. Second, we used a probability function to estimate a p-score for each 
school, and assigned each student the p-score of his/her school. Third, we sorted students by their 
schools’ p-score. Fourth, we separated students into groups so no significant difference existed 
between the mean p-score of the CONAFE and non-CONAFE students in a group. Finally, we 
tested separately for each background variable whether values of the variable were balanced 
between the CONAFE and non-CONAFE students in a group. We used this algorithm for 
primary and secondary schools separately. 
Following this methodology, we first used three criteria to select background variables 
that would identify similar CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools in those databases. First, we 
excluded endogenous variables. For example, data on student failure rates would help identify 
similar CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools. But a goal of CONAFE is to lower failure rates. 
Since CONAFE likely affects the failure rates of its students, data on failure is an inappropriate 
control for isolating the effect of CONAFE. If all background data from years before when 
CONAFE began, then endogenous variables would effectively select CONAFE and non-
CONAFE schools. Since we do not, however, have data on most CONAFE schools before 
CONAFE began supporting those schools, we exclude such variables from background selection.  
  Second, we required the availability of data on a variable for at least two different years 
and grades. Since a school’s propensity score was constant for all five years, we wanted to avoid 
the potential bias of selecting an outlier data point from one grade-year.  
The third criterion considered specific requirements of the propensity score match. To 
ensure balance between the CONAFE and non-CONAFE group, we had to exclude some   13
variables that perfectly predicted CONAFE participation and other variables that could not have 
equal sample means in p-score divisions of the CONAFE and non-CONAFE samples.  
These three criteria gave us five context variables for primary schools and four context 
variables for secondary schools. For primary schools, we considered the Mexican state in which 
the school was located, the community’s principal economic activity (primary, secondary or 
tertiary), the school modality (urban public, urban private, rural or indigenous), the average 
literacy of students’ fathers, and the presence of sewage facilities. All background information 
came from student surveys except for information on community economic activity, which came 
from a school director’s survey. For secondary schools, we considered the state of Mexico in 
which the school is located, the community’s principal economic activity (primary, secondary or 
tertiary), the presence of a telephone in the student’s community, and the average literacy of 
students’ fathers. All indicators for both primary and secondary school were expressed as a series 
of dummy variables. 
  We then formed combined databases of schools for which we had data in any year. We 
considered including only schools for which data appeared in every year of the 1998-2002 
sample. For the primary schools, that limit would have included about 70 percent of all the 
schools that appeared in any year. Because it is unlikely, however, that the schools surveyed in 
every year are randomly selected from the schools surveyed in any year, we instead formed a 
combined database of schools present in any year. We collapsed that database to include one 
entry for each school, including mean values for the selected background variables. That collapse 
produced one database of schools with codes and background information for each school.   14
With the school database, we then used a probit model to determine the propensity score 
(p-score) for each school. The probit estimates the probability that a school will receive 
CONAFE support given a vector of the selected context variables: 
) ( ) 1 ( , , t i t i Q F CONAFE P = =   (3.1)
) ( 1 ) 0 ( , , t i t i Q F CONAFE P − = =   (3.2)
t i
P
t i t t t i Z Q , ,
1 0
, ε φ φ + + =   (3.3)
where CONAFE is a dummy variable indicating whether school i in year t received CONAFE 
support; and Qi,t is an index function based on a vector of school background characteristics Zi,t, 
an error term  ε , and a series of constants φ . This probit gave us the p-score of each school 
observation.  
At this point we associated students with the p-scores of their schools, so we had a 
database of students and each student had a p-score. We then ranked student observations by 
ascending p-scores and divided observations into groups so the difference in mean p-score 
between CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools for a given group was not significantly different 
at the 0.05 level. One group, for example, included all students with p-score between 0.0 and 
1.1.We then tested that within each group, the difference in mean value for each background 
variable was not significantly different between CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools. When we 
could not satisfy that balancing property, as explained in the third criterion of variable selection, 
we increased the number of groups; when such increase could not satisfy the balancing property, 
we excluded the variable from construction of p-scores.  
Since not every disadvantaged school receives CONAFE support, the p-score effectively 
selects CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools with similar backgrounds. A p-score of 1 indicated 
that a school had a typical CONAFE profile (i.e., student’s parents are illiterate, school is small   15
and rural, etc.), and a p-score of 0 indicated that the school had a background very different from 
the background of a typical CONAFE school. 
  It is interesting to know not only how CONAFE affects student achievement, but to know 
how CONAFE differently affects the most and least disadvantaged students in Mexico. To make 
such comparison, we divided students into groups of relative disadvantage with p-scores between 
0.1 and 0.3, p-scores between 0.4 and 0.6, and for primary schools, p-scores between 0.7 and 0.9, 
and we compared performance over time of matched CONAFE and non-CONAFE students by 
relative disadvantage. For example, we compared the improvement of matched CONAFE and 
non-CONAFE students with levels of disadvantage between 0.4 and 0.6 between 1998 and 2002. 
According to equation (2.2), the amount by which CONAFE student improvement exceeded 
non-CONAFE student improvement represented the effect of CONAFE on student learning. 
 
Data 
We used three types of databases for this evaluation: student-level test databases (Test) 
containing test scores and student background information, school-level databases (Drop) 
containing data on student repetition and failure, and school-level background databases (Bgrd) 
with data from school principal and school teacher questionnaires. Entries in each of the three 
databases included a school code that let us identify the same school in all three databases. A 
summary of databases used appears in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
 
Table 3. Primary School Databases 
Respondent Year(s)  Type  Grade  Obs Schools 
Principal 1996-2000  Bgrd    3,681 3,681 
Student 1998  Test Second  43,398  2,581 
Student 1998  Bgrd Fourth  47,497  3,140 
Student 1998  Bgrd  Fifth  44,912  3,037 
Student 1999  Test  Third  49,136  3,098 
Student 2000  Test  Fourth  46,252  3,040   16
Student 2000  Bgrd  Sixth  45,676  3,189 
Student 2001  Bgrd  Third  48,903  3,268 
Student  2001  Bgrd & Test  Fifth  46,718  3,221 
Student 2002  Bgrd Fourth  48,451  3,205 
Student  2002  Bgrd & Test  Sixth  46,365  3,165 
Student 1992-2002  Drop  First-Sixth  583,876 82,520 
Teacher 1998  Bgrd   23,357  3,562 
Teacher 2001  Bgrd   22,917  3,437 
Teacher 2002  Bgrd   20,634  3,373 
Source: SEP data.         
 
Table 4. Secondary School Databases 
Respondent Year  Type  Grade Obs  Schools 
Principal 2000  Bgrd    1,406  1,403 
Principal 2001  Bgrd    1,184  1,181 
Principal 2002  Bgrd    860  860 
Student 2000  Test Seventh  39,562  1,189 
Student  2001  Bgrd & Test  Eighth  39,562  1,189 
Student 2002  Bgrd Eighth  53,919  1,982 
Student  2002  Bgrd & Test  Ninth  53,202  1,980 
Source: SEP data. 
 
Information on student test scores came from Estándares Nacionales (EN), an exam that 
Mexican students took in each year during the period 1998-2002. This test provides information 
about student ability in Spanish and math. Mexico’s Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) also 
reports a composite global score based on the student’s Spanish and math ability. SEP 
standardizes scores to control for changes in exam difficulty between grades and test years. EN 
gives information on 45,000 students from 3,000 primary schools. The EN sample is relatively 
small: in 1999, CONAFE gave didactic content support to about 4 million students, so the EN 
sample includes about 1 percent of all CONAFE students. 
  EN’s sampling is based on an earlier selection of representative schools. In 1996, SEP 
selected 3,000 schools to include in its test-score sample.
5 Those schools evenly represented 
states, socioeconomic backgrounds, student gender, and other demographic factors of the 
                                                 
5 In the 1996-1998 period, SEP gave students a different test, the results of which are not comparable with EN.    17
Mexican population. Each year, SEP adjusts the schools and students in the sample to ensure that 
it represents Mexico’s national profile.  
  For choosing students within the selected schools, SEP uses two algorithms. For primary 
schools with fewer than 80 students, SEP included every student in the sample who took the 
exam. Since SEP gave exams in few grades each year, not every student in the school appeared 
in the exam. For primary schools with more than 80 students, SEP randomly selected 25 students 
to include in the sample. For secondary schools with fewer than 200 students, SEP included 
every student in the sample who took the exam. For secondary schools with more than 200 
students, SEP randomly selected 36 students to include in the sample. So the likelihood that a 
student in a small school appears in the sample is higher than the likelihood that a student in a 
large school appears in the sample. This bias suggests that our results over-represent students in 
small schools. 
The EN database included data from a variety of grades and years. To allow comparison 
of a cohort, we used primary school test data from second grade in 1998, third grade in 1999, 
fourth grade in 2000, fifth grade in 2001 and sixth grade in 2002. Those grades represent the 
grade of test content; a fourth grade exam includes material that a student should have learned in 
fourth grade. Similarly, we used secondary school test data from third grade in the year 2000 
through third grade in the year 2002. The exact students in each grade-year varied, so we did not 
exactly use a cohort. Rather, we followed a group of schools through time while allowing the 
students within those schools to vary randomly. 
  For each student in the EN sample, the Evaluation Division of Mexico’s Secretariat of 
Public Education (DGE) reports three scores. The first is a Spanish score based on a multiple-
choice Spanish language exam. The second is a mathematics score also based on a multiple-  18
choice exam. The third is a global score, which is a composite number based on Spanish and 
math scores that represents a student’s overall exam performance. While an increase in math or 
Spanish scores will increase global scores, the increase is rarely proportional.  
  SEP calibrates exams using the Rasch correction, which compensates for changes in 
exam difficulty in different years and grades. In the Rasch model, the probability of a student i 
giving a correct response to question j, represented as P(yij=1), depends on the student’s ability 

















= =  
(3.1)
That correction compensates only for changes in the difficulty of exams in different years and 
grades. Thus, a score of 150 in Spanish in 1998 represents the same knowledge level as a 150 in 
Spanish in 2000, even though the exam questions in 2000 may have been more difficult than the 
questions in 1998. If student ability improves over time, then mean test scores should rise over 
time. The correction also makes different grades comparable: a student’s 150 in Spanish in third 
grade one year and her 150 in Spanish in fourth grade the next year suggest that the student did 
not learn in fourth grade. Since this correction does not compensate for changes in student 
learning, average scores should increase over time and between grades. 
  The Drop databases list failure and repetition rates by year for every school that appears 
in the Test database. While the Test data are at the student level, the Drop data are at the school 
level. Also, the Drop data are averaged for all grades in the school, so Drop lists only a single 
repetition and dropout number for each school. 
  The third data source includes a variety of databases that include context data from 
questionnaires given to teachers and school principals (Tables 3-4). While we can identify a   19
student, parent and school principal in different databases with a particular school, we cannot 




Between 2 and 12 percent of students who took the exams did not provide some context 
data. Those non-responding students were significantly more disadvantaged than were 
responding students. In a given year, the portion of CONAFE students who failed to provide 
information was between 1.5 and 3 times the portion of non-CONAFE students who failed to 
provide information. Since much context information was available at the school and not the 
student level, we had some context data for most students.  
We did simple explorations of non-response bias by comparing the responses for one 
background indicator between students who did and did not respond to another indicator. For 
example, we compared the failure rates of students who did and did not indicate whether their 
parents were literate (Table 5). It is unclear whether non-response is due to students purposefully 
not filling out bubbles on answer sheets, administrative errors in processing student replies, or 
other reasons. We made this comparison for several grades and indicators; only two grades 
appear in Table 5. In every grade, the rate of non-response among CONAFE students was 1.5 to 
3 times the rate of non-response among non-CONAFE students. The students who did not reply 
to the literacy question had markedly higher rates of failure than students who did reply to the 
failure question. Failure rates among students who did not reply to the literacy question were 20-
50% higher than were failure rates of students who did reply to the literacy question.  
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Table 5. Failure rates among students who gave no literacy reply 
1998 Fourth Grade  2000 Sixth Grade   
 
Percent 
Con Non Diff  Con  Non  Diff 
Gave no failure reply   12.02  4.97  7.05  4.08  2.51  1.57 
Overall failure rate  0.33  0.18  0.15  0.32  0.17  0.15 
Failure rate if gave no literacy  reply  0.39  0.29 0.09  0.43 0.29 0.15 
Difference  0.06  0.12 0.06  0.12 0.12 0.00 
Source: SEP Data  
 
We performed similar comparison for the literacy rates of students who gave no failure 
reply, and for the global scores of students who gave no failure reply. In every case, the rate of 
non-response among CONAFE students was significantly higher than the rate of non-response 
among non-CONAFE students. It also appeared that the bias created by non-response for a given 
student among CONAFE and non-CONAFE students was comparable. In other words, the 
difference between responding and non-responding students was comparable among both 
CONAFE and non-CONAFE students. Since a higher portion of CONAFE students failed to 
provide background information, and since non-responding students were more disadvantaged, 
we interpreted that non-response bias made the CONAFE students more disadvantaged than the 
non-CONAFE students. For CONAFE results in the present paper to equal non-CONAFE 
results, then, CONAFE students must overcome the additional disadvantage of their backgrounds 
that response bias prevents us from measuring. This finding further highlights the caveat that 




In a given grade-year, CONAFE supported 35-45 percent of primary school students in 
the sample; and 30-40 percent of secondary schools a given grade-year were telesecundarias. 
CONAFE support was also relatively static over the sample period. Nearly 70 percent of schools   21
in the sample received CONAFE support for all five years of the sample. Ten percent of schools 
received CONAFE support for four years, 5 percent received support for three years, 10 percent 
received support for two years, and 7 percent received support for only one year. CONAFE also 
appeared to give the longest-standing support to the most disadvantaged schools, as parent 
literacy, community services and other disadvantage indicators showed more extreme levels of 
disadvantage in schools that CONAFE supported for longer periods of time. 
Though CONAFE’s compensatory education programs operate in every state, the number 
of CONAFE-supported schools varies markedly between states. For example, over 20 percent of 
the CONAFE schools in the sample come from just four states – Chihuahua, Veracruz, Jalisco 
and Durango – while the six states of Baja California, Mexico City, Guanajuato, Tlaxcala, 
Morelos and Zacatecas combined include just 10.7 percent of CONAFE schools. These data are 
based on the number of CONAFE schools in a state relative to the number of CONAFE schools 
in all of Mexico, so the number of schools in a state may affect a state’s ranking. 
CONAFE schools are significantly poorer and more disadvantaged than non-CONAFE 
schools are. In 1998, for example, 93 percent of non-CONAFE mothers were literate, whereas 78 
percent of CONAFE mothers were literate. In the same year, only 39 percent of non-CONAFE 
community employment centered on primary (extractive) industries, while 89 percent of 
CONAFE community employment centered on primary industries.  Measuring CONAFE’s 
effect by comparing CONAFE scores to non-CONAFE scores assumes that students in the 
CONAFE and non-CONAFE group have similar backgrounds. CONAFE students live in less 
educated communities and have access to fewer social services than non-CONAFE students.  
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Primary School Results 
Before presenting results, we should emphasize that the limited data available to pair 
students of similar backgrounds makes it likely that unobserved factors for which available data 
did not control could likely influence the results of this control group comparison. CONAFE 
students are generally more disadvantaged than are non-CONAFE students, so it is likely that the 
non-CONAFE students in each of the three disadvantage groups have more prosperous 
backgrounds than do CONAFE students. For the experimental and control groups to demonstrate 
comparable performance, CONAFE would have to overcome these unobserved factors. Since 
unobserved factors limit CONAFE results, figures based on control group analysis are an 
absolute lower bound for the positive effect of CONAFE on student achievement. In other 
words, the actual effect of CONAFE on student performance is likely more positive than this 
report estimates. 
Global, math and Spanish scores of CONAFE students increased over the sample period 
for all three groups of disadvantage. While average global scores of the less disadvantaged and 
mid-range groups increased by 18.7 and 20.4 points per year, respectively, global scores of 
disadvantaged CONAFE students increased by only 16.3 points per year (Table 6). 
Disadvantaged students may learn more slowly because they have less pre-school education, 
which could cause their scores to increase at a slower rate. Of course, these increases are 
predictable given that the cohort includes higher grades in later years, and thus one should expect 
test scores to rise each year. The most accurate conclusion to infer from annual increase in test 
scores is that students gain new Spanish and math skills in each year of education, and that both 
CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools add value. We cannot, however, determine from this 
finding that CONAFE itself is a source of that value.    23
We also determined that CONAFE had caused part of these test score increases. In each 
of the three disadvantage groups, the experimental group gained annually on the control group 
by 2.4 to 4.3 points in global scores. This increase is the minimum effect attributable to 
CONAFE. Similarity in results across each of the three disadvantage groups re-affirms the 
positive effect of CONAFE on student achievement. CONAFE students gained on their non-
CONAFE peers in math scores by 4.8 to 5.6 points per year. According to this data, however, 
disadvantaged CONAFE students gained on their peers by 1.2 points per year in Spanish exams, 
but mid-range and less-disadvantaged students fell behind by 2.8 to 3.6 points per year in 
Spanish exams (Table 6). These numbers may be negative due to the imperfect control group 
construction—unobserved factors correlated with CONAFE mean that these figures are the 
minimum positive effect attributable to CONAFE. They may also be negative simply because 
CONAFE did not increase test scores of all students. So CONAFE improved math scores in 
primary school, but its effect on Spanish scores was unclear. 
One of main our findings is that CONAFE also appeared to decrease test score inequality 
between comparable CONAFE and non-CONAFE students. Disadvantaged non-CONAFE 
students outperformed their CONAFE peers on an average exam application by 13.7 global 
points. But CONAFE decreased global test score inequality between disadvantaged CONAFE 
students and disadvantaged non-CONAFE students by 4.2 points per year. A linear projection of 
CONAFE and non-CONAFE improvements shows that CONAFE decreased test score inequality 
in each category of exam and group of disadvantage by 9 percent per year in the less-
disadvantaged group, 16 percent per year in the mid-range group, and 30 percent per year in the 
disadvantaged group (Table 6). Of course, actual test score improvements may be logarithmic, 
and it is likely that the significant test score increases demonstrated in the early years of   24
CONAFE support will shrink as the achievement of CONAFE students approaches the 
achievement of their non-CONAFE peers. Nonetheless, it seems that CONAFE is rapidly 
decreasing learning inequality, as CONAFE significantly decreases achievement inequality, and 
that the decrease in inequality is largest for the most disadvantaged students. 
In all three disadvantage groups, CONAFE was slower to close the Spanish test score gap 
than to close the math test score gap between CONAFE and non-CONAFE students. In the mid-
range and less-disadvantaged groups, this data showed no evidence of CONAFE closing the 
Spanish gap. While the Spanish gap of the disadvantaged group decreased at an annual rate of 
1.2 points, the Spanish gap of the mid-range and less-disadvantaged groups increased at 2.7 and 
3.3 points per year (Table 6).  
  One might hypothesize that CONAFE is less effective in primary school Spanish 
instruction than in math instruction due to the presence of indigenous students. This 
interpretation is incorrect. On a disadvantage ranking of 0 to 1, we defined the disadvantaged 
group to have a score between 0.7 and 0.9. Only 1 of the 2,744 indigenous schools in DGE’s 
sample fell into the disadvantaged group. All other indigenous schools had a disadvantage 
ranking above 0.9. It is possible that indigenous students are present in schools identified as rural 
public schools. Those students would have a lower return to Spanish education. Hence, one 
would expect that CONAFE schools containing indigenous students would show slower 
improvement on Spanish exams than would CONAFE schools without indigenous students. But 
the Spanish-math differential is notable in both the disadvantaged and less-disadvantaged groups, 
and indigenous students are likely to have little presence in the less-disadvantaged group. 
Furthermore, Spanish education appeared to be more effective in disadvantaged schools than in 
less-disadvantaged schools, and indigenous students are likely to have the highest presence in   25
disadvantaged schools. Thus, influential factors besides the presence of indigenous students 
cause CONAFE to be more effective for math instruction than for Spanish instruction. Those 
factors may be pedagogical: perhaps improving math learning at the primary level requires few 
resources, while improving Spanish learning requires many resources. Also, the average gap 
between CONAFE and non-CONAFE students was larger in math than in Spanish for two of the 
three disadvantage groups studied. Thus, another possible explanation is simply that math 
instruction in non-CONAFE schools is less effective than Spanish instruction in non-CONAFE 
schools, so a given infusion of CONAFE resources will increase math more than Spanish scores.   26
Table 6. Primary School Test Scores, 1998-2002 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Ave Trend 
Less-disadvantaged group 
Global 
Non-Conafe  452.8 431.4 481.7 489.3 505.2 472.1  16.3 
CONAFE  414.9 410.2 456.5 463.6 481.7 445.4  18.7 
Difference  -37.9 -21.3 -25.2 -25.7 -23.5 -26.7  2.4 
Math 
Non-Conafe  453.6 431.8 483.8 488.4 498.0 471.1  14.5 
CONAFE  416.2 405.5 453.4 466.7 483.0 445.0  19.5 
Difference  -37.5 -26.3 -30.4 -21.6 -15.0 -26.2  5.0 
Spanish 
Non-Conafe  416.3 429.5 479.9 490.6 510.9 465.4  25.0 
CONAFE  396.8 412.9 460.0 457.9 481.3 441.8  21.4 
Difference  -19.5 -16.6 -19.9 -32.6 -29.6 -23.6  -3.6 
Mid-range Group 
Global 
Non-Conafe  451.0 428.9 481.4 488.8 501.7 470.3  16.1 
CONAFE  408.3 412.2 450.3 463.3 485.1 443.8  20.5 
Difference  -42.6 -16.7 -31.1 -25.5 -16.6 -26.5  4.3 
Math 
Non-Conafe  449.5 428.8 482.5 488.9 495.8 469.1  15.3 
CONAFE  408.8 410.6 450.3 464.7 486.0 444.1  20.9 
Difference  -40.8 -18.2 -32.1 -24.2  -9.8  -25.0  5.6 
Spanish 
Non-Conafe  410.3 426.9 480.7 488.4 506.4 462.5  25.4 
CONAFE  395.5 411.7 450.0 459.4 484.7 440.3  22.6 
Difference  -14.8 -15.2 -30.7 -29.1 -21.6 -22.3  -2.8 
Disadvantaged Group 
Global 
Non-Conafe  458.2 423.2 467.1 478.7 491.2 463.7  12.1 
CONAFE  430.8 410.2 457.7 467.2 483.9 450.0  16.3 
Difference  -27.4  -12.9 -9.4 -11.5 -7.3 -13.7 4.2 
Math 
Non-Conafe  458.0 420.6 466.3 478.2 488.4 462.3  11.8 
CONAFE  434.2 404.6 457.2 469.8 484.9 450.1  16.7 
Difference  -23.8  -16.0  -9.1 -8.5 -3.5  -12.2 4.8 
Spanish 
Non-Conafe  416.1 424.0 467.4 478.3 493.4 455.9  20.9 
CONAFE  397.2 413.5 457.9 462.3 483.2 442.8  22.1 
Difference  -18.9 -10.6  -9.5  -16.1 -10.3 -13.1  1.2 
 
 
Source: Estándares Nacionales 1998-2002  27
Indigenous Primary School Results 
Since indigenous students tend to be geographically isolated, SEP identifies indigenous 
education as a modality separate from rural or urban education. But the difficulty of forming an 
effective control group against which to compare indigenous students makes evaluation of 
indigenous education difficult. Every indigenous school but one had a p-score of over 0.9. Those 
scores are high in part because nearly all indigenous schools receive CONAFE support, and in 
part because indigenous schools are extremely disadvantaged. Because the schools with p-scores 
over 0.99 represent the highest tail end of disadvantage, it is likely that indigenous schools in this 
group have very different characteristics than do non-indigenous schools in this group. Thus, this 
section focuses on the indigenous school group with p-scores between 0.9 and 0.99. We use non-
indigenous and non-CONAFE schools with p-scores between 0.9 and 0.99 as control groups. 
Data from 1998 in the 0.9 to 0.99 p-score range included only 55 indigenous students, so we 
excluded 1998 data from this analysis.  
Indigenous students effectively learned much of the material they studied in primary 
school. Indigenous students with CONAFE support rapidly improved their test performance over 
the sample period. Indigenous global scores increased an average of 19 points per year, with an 
annual average math score increase of 26.8 points and an average Spanish score increase of 12.3 
points. From 1999 to 2002, indigenous scores increased from 398 to 454 points in global scores, 
from 385 to 464 points in math scores, and from 407 to 447 points in Spanish scores (Table 7). 
Again, it is likely that much of this increase is attributable to cohort’s following of students 
through different grades in different years, so the appropriate conclusion to reach from this data 
is that indigenous students learn a significant amount of new material in each year of education.   28
CONAFE appeared to cause some of this math score improvement, but again we found 
no effect on Spanish scores. In 1999, indigenous students scored an average of 32.6 points 
behind comparable non-CONAFE non-indigenous students did in math scores. That math score 
gap decreased by an average of 5 points annually. Due to yearly test score fluctuations, however, 
indigenous students in 2002 remained 21.2 points behind comparable non-indigenous students. 
Decomposing non-indigenous students into CONAFE and non-CONAFE students gives a clearer 
picture. Indigenous students remained significantly behind their non-indigenous CONAFE and 
non-CONAFE peers. In math scores, however, indigenous students gained on non-indigenous 
CONAFE students by a 5.0 points per year, and they gained on non-indigenous non-CONAFE 
students  by 6.5 points per year (Table 7).  
Indigenous students actually fell behind their peers in Spanish scores, as indigenous 
student Spanish scores increased from an average 407 points in 1999 to 447 points in 2002, with 
an average annual increase of 12.3 points per year. But on the same exam over the same time 
period, non-indigenous students improved by an average annual increase of 19.1 points per year 
from 419 to 481 points (non-indigenous CONAFE) and from 429 to 493 points (non-indigenous 
non-CONAFE) (Table 7). At least two factors explain why indigenous Spanish learning 
improves slowly. First, many indigenous students have a native language as mother tongue and 
do not receive reinforcement of school Spanish learning at home. Since practically all indigenous 
students receive CONAFE support, available data do not allow us to control for home language 
in measuring CONAFE’s effect. Second, instruction of indigenous students faces extra hurdles of 
the difficulty of finding well-trained bilingual teachers and bilingual didactic materials. 
CONAFE has focused on overcoming the second obstacle to indigenous student performance, 
and results show that indigenous students are improving their Spanish performance. But because   29
practically every indigenous student is in CONAFE, the most accurate conclusions one can reach 
are that indigenous student performance on Spanish and math exams is improving, that 
indigenous students are learning more quickly in math than in Spanish, and that indigenous 




Table 7. Primary School Test Scores by Ethnicity, 1999-2002 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 Ave Trend 
Global 
Indigenous  397.5 415.0 436.4 453.6 425.6  19.0 
All non-ind  417.8 461.8 464.8 484.2 457.2  20.2 
Non-CONAFE  425.5 468.8 467.3 490.7 463.1  19.4 
CONAFE  417.2 460.0 464.3 482.1 455.9  19.9 
Diff  20.3 46.8 28.4 30.7 31.5  1.3 
Math 
Indigenous  385.4 407.0 440.4 463.6 424.1  26.8 
All non-ind  414.5 460.2 467.4 484.8 456.7  21.8 
Non-CONAFE  421.4 465.0 470.2 487.2 460.9  20.3 
CONAFE  414.1 459.0 466.7 484.0 456.0  21.8 
Diff  29.2 53.2 27.0 21.2 32.6 -5.0 
Spanish 
Indigenous  407.3 424.7 428.0 447.3 426.8  12.3 
All Non-indig.  419.3 463.1 459.6 484.0 456.5  19.1 
Non-CONAFE  428.5 472.8 462.1 493.4 464.2  18.4 
CONAFE  418.7 460.8 459.1 480.9 454.9  18.5 
Diff  12.0 38.5 31.7 36.7 29.7  6.7 
Source: Estándares Nacionales 1999-2002. “Diff” is the difference between indigenous and all non-indigenous 
students. Universe is students with p-score between 0.9 and 0.99.   30
Secondary School Results  
Mexico offers both traditional education and telesecundaria education for secondary 
students. Telesecundarias are rural schools where lectures are played on television for students 
and a local teacher oversees classwork and exam application. This section only examines 
telesecundaria schools. 
Math and Spanish scores of telesecundaria students increased over the sample period. 
Global scores of both disadvantage groups rapidly increased from an average of 499 points in 
2000 to an average of 540 points in 2002. A linear projection of that trend showed that global 
scores of the less-disadvantaged telesecundaria group increased by 21.5 points annually, and that 
scores of the mid-range group increased by 19.3 points annually. Similar trends appeared for 
math and Spanish exams. For the less-disadvantaged group, math scores rose by 10.7 points 
annually and Spanish scores rose by a striking 27.2 points annually. Similarly, for the mid-range 
group, math scores rose by 12.7 points annually and Spanish scores rose by 26.7 points annually 
(Table 8). These increases are partly attributable to the different grades of students in this cohort 
in different years. 
Telesecundaria education appeared to cause part of those increases in math and Spanish 
scores, as telesecundaria students showed more rapid score improvement than comparable non-
telesecundaria students did in math and Spanish exams during the 2000-2002 period. For the 
less-disadvantaged group, telesecundaria average annual performance growth exceeded non-
telesecundaria average annual performance growth by 1.4 points in math and by 3.4 points in 
Spanish. Results were less clear in the mid-range group, where inequality between 
telesecundaria and non-telesecundaria students decreased by 0.02 points per year in math scores 
and 0.8 points per year in Spanish scores. Telesecundaria education eliminated 24 percent of   31
average telesecundaria-non-telesecundaria inequality in math scores, and 33 percent of average 
inequality in Spanish scores. The effects of telesecundaria education were less notable in the 
mid-range group, where telesecundarias eliminated 0.4 percent of average inequality in math 
scores and 10 percent of inequality in Spanish scores (Table 8). These numbers are the minimum 
positive effect of telesecundarias on improving student achievement. 
For both groups of disadvantage, telesecundarias appeared to be more effective in 
improving Spanish scores than in improving math scores. This finding is particularly interesting 
given that CONAFE’s primary school interventions appeared to be more effective for math 
education than for Spanish education. Data on secondary education lacks a modality identifier, 
so we cannot determine the portion of indigenous students in this sample. Since no high-
disadvantage group could be constructed, however, it is likely that few or no indigenous schools 
appear in this sample, and that other factors must explain the difference in performance between 
Spanish and math exams. This finding contrasts with an IDB evaluation, which found that 
telesecundaria education was effective in both math and Spanish instruction, but that 
telesecundarias were slightly more effective in math than in Spanish (Castro, Wolff and García 
2001). 
  It may be that self-selection bias of rural students biases analyses of telesecundarias—
perhaps the best-achieving rural students make extra effort to attend telesecundarias, while 
lower-achieving rural students do not. If those students’ observable background characteristics 
reflect their propensity to learn in school, then the p-score matching should eliminate this 
potential bias. If observable characteristics do not identify student propensity to learn, however, 
then this bias may affect these results, and imply that the CONAFE students discussed here have   32
a higher propensity to achieve than their backgrounds imply, and thus CONAFE may not explain 
all of the telesecundaria score improvement.   33
Table 8. Test Scores of Telesecundaria students 
    2000 2001 2002 Ave Trend 
Less-Disadvantaged Group 
Global 
Non-tel  530.2 552.5 564.2 549.0  17.0 
Tel.  523.9 539.2 562.6 541.9  19.3 
Difference  -6.3 -13.3 -1.6  -7.1  2.4 
Math 
Non-tel  527.8 534.2 546.4 536.1  9.3 
Tel.  521.9 525.7 543.3 530.3  10.7 
Difference  -5.9 -8.5 -3.1 -5.8 1.4 
Spanish 
Non-tel  535.9 570.4 583.6 563.3  23.9 
Tel.  528.1 552.6 582.5 554.4  27.2 
Difference  -7.8 -17.8 -1.1  -8.9  3.4 
Mid-Range Group 
Global 
Non-tel  481.19 495.67 522.66 499.84  20.73 
Tel.  473.98 488.58 517.05  493.2  21.53 
Difference  -7.2  -7.09 -5.61 -6.64  0.8 
Math 
Non-tel  497.67 507.98 523.08 509.58  12.71 
Tel.  492.4  503.18 517.86 504.48  12.73 
Difference  -5.27 -4.8 -5.23 -5.1 0.02 
Spanish 
Non-tel  473.34 495.02 525.14 497.83  25.9 
Tel.  465.27 486.94 518.65 490.28  26.69 
Difference  -8.07 -8.08 -6.49 -7.54 0.79 
Source : Estándares Nacionales 2000-2002. 
 
Failure and Repetition Rates 
A main goal of CONAFE is to lower failure and repetition rates. CONAFE maintains 
databases on these indicators for all schools, which allowed us to measure CONAFE’s effect on 
failure and repetition rates.  
We began with data on repetition and failure rates in every school that appeared in 
DGE’s sample. We compared repetition rates for a cohort of CONAFE and non-CONAFE 
schools by disadvantage group for second grade in 1998 through sixth grade in 2002. The   34
average annual change in inequality between the CONAFE and non-CONAFE groups is the 
minimum positive effect attributable to CONAFE. 
Repetition rates of CONAFE students were, as expected, significantly higher than 
repetition rates of non-CONAFE students in every grade, year, and disadvantage group. 
Repetition rates dropped by between 0.42 and 0.66 percentage points per year among CONAFE 
students (Table 9). Of course, because our analysis compares different grades in different years, 
it is likely that the lowest achieving students leave school each year, and that a decrease in 
repetition rates is partly attributable to difference in the students that attend each grade.  
But it appears that CONAFE caused part of this decrease in repetition rates. In the 
disadvantaged group, CONAFE students had an annual average increase of 0.08 percentage 
points in repetition rates above their non-CONAFE peers. But in both the mid-range and non-
disadvantaged groups, CONAFE students had an annual average decrease of 0.35 and 0.13 
percentage points, respectively, against their non-CONAFE peers. Those decreases represent the 
lower level of repetition that CONAFE causes among its supported students. On balance, it 
appears that CONAFE decreases repetition rates by about 0.13 percent (0.0013 points) per year, 
but that effect varies between disadvantage groups. While this affect may appear to be small, it 
suggests that CONAFE annually eliminates 6 percent of inequality in repetition rates between 
comparable CONAFE and non-CONAFE students (Table 9). 
Data on failure rates suggest less conclusive results. CONAFE students fail at a much 
higher rate than do comparable non-CONAFE students: among the grades and disadvantage 
groups analyzed, an average of 5.04 percent of non-CONAFE students failed a class subject in a 
given year, whereas an average of 7.22 percent of CONAFE students did. But the annual effect 
of CONAFE on decreasing failure rates appeared to be positive for the non-disadvantaged group,   35
negative for the mid-range group, and nonexistent for the disadvantaged group. The average of 
those groups indicates that CONAFE lowers failure rates annually by 0.3 percent (.003 points), 
but that number is negative primarily because the non-disadvantaged group showed such a 
significant effect on failure rates (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Effect of CONAFE on Failure and Repetition Rates, 1998-2001 
    1998 1999 2000 2001 Ave Trend 
Less-disadvantaged Group 
Failure 
Noncon  4.38 4.03 3.88 3.47 3.94 -0.29 
Con  9.65 7.12 6.28 5.36  7.1 -1.37 
Diff  5.27  3.09 2.4  1.9 3.16  -1.08 
Repetition 
Noncon  4.42 3.85 3.85 3.47  3.9 -0.29 
Con  7.66 7.52 6.45 6.62 7.06 -0.42 
Diff  3.25 3.66 2.59 3.16 3.16 -0.13 
Mid-range Group 
Failure 
Noncon  6.58  6.21 5.3 5.09  5.79  -0.54 
Con  7.61 7.25 6.94 6.54 7.08 -0.35 
Diff  1.03 1.04 1.64 1.45 1.29 0.19 
Repetition 
Noncon  5.3  5.67 5.44 4.34 5.19 -0.31 
Con  8.44 6.66 7.16 6.08 7.08 -0.66 
Diff  3.14 0.98 1.72 1.74 1.89 -0.35 
Disadvantaged Group 
Failure 
Noncon  6.66 4.55 5.37 5.02  5.4 -0.41 
Con  7.72 8.25 7.26 6.66 7.47 -0.42 
Diff  1.06 3.71 1.89 1.65 2.08  0 
Repetition 
Noncon  7.39 4.89 6.22 5.09  5.9 -0.56 
Con  7.87 7.59 7.28 6.36 7.28 -0.48 
Diff  0.48  2.7  1.06 1.27 1.38 0.08 
Source: Estándares Nacionales 1998-2001. Data are percentages of all students in sample. “Failure” is the percent 




This analysis used student test scores and school-level indicators to evaluate the 
effectiveness of CONAFE in improving the quality of primary and telesecundaria education. We 
have used five approaches to measure CONAFE’s effects. First, we compared the disadvantage 
of all CONAFE and non-CONAFE schools to examine the effectiveness of CONAFE’s targeting   37
mechanism and to show the need for construction of control groups. Second, we measured 
CONAFE’s effect on primary school test scores. Third, we measured CONAFE’s effect on 
indigenous students. Fourth, we measured CONAFE’s effect on secondary school test scores. 
Finally, we analyzed CONAFE’s effect on failure and repetition rates.  
CONAFE’s targeting mechanism appears to be accurate. CONAFE’s guidelines direct 
that every indigenous school should receive CONAFE support. We found that only 18 schools in 
the sample, representing 0.5 percent of indigenous schools, did not receive CONAFE support, 
and those schools may simply be data errors. CONAFE students are significantly more 
disadvantaged than are non-CONAFE students in test score achievement, parent literacy, 
household services and community industrial development. These differences between CONAFE 
and non-CONAFE students show that comparison of CONAFE performance to national 
performance fails to control for important background differences, and that construction of a 
comparable non-CONAFE control group is necessary to measure CONAFE’s effect. 
In primary schools, we found that CONAFE students effectively learned new material 
throughout primary school and that CONAFE added value in math instruction, but we found no 
significant impact of CONAFE on Spanish scores. CONAFE increased math scores by 4.8 to 5.6 
points per year, and CONAFE decreased inequality between comparable CONAFE and non-
CONAFE students in global scores by between 9 and 30 percent per year. CONAFE’s 
insignificant effect on primary school Spanish learning is not due to the presence of indigenous 
students in CONAFE schools. Also, our methodology of control group construction meant that 
these numbers are the minimum positive effect attributable to CONAFE, and so CONAFE’s true 
effect is above these estimates. Overall, CONAFE caused an annual score increase of 3.7 global 
points, or 0.8 percent. Given average global score inequality between CONAFE and non-  38
CONAFE students of 22.3 points, a linear projection of score increases would predict CONAFE 
to eliminate test score inequality in about six years. It is likely, however, that test score increases 
are logarithmic and not linear, and thus actual time required for test scores to become equal may 
be much longer.  
Indigenous students learn a significant amount of new material as they proceed through 
primary school. CONAFE students gained in math scores by 6.5 points against non-CONAFE 
non-indigenous students and by 5 points annually against comparable CONAFE non-indigenous 
students. However, CONAFE had no discernible and consistent effect on indigenous Spanish 
scores. 
While CONAFE was more effective for math instruction in primary school, CONAFE 
was more effective for Spanish instruction in secondary school. CONAFE appeared to increase 
telesecundaria Spanish scores by 0.8 to 3.4 points per year, while CONAFE increased math 
scores by 0.02 to 1.4 points per year. That effect represents an annual decrease in test score 
inequality between less-disadvantaged CONAFE and non-CONAFE students of 24 percent in 
math scores and 38 percent in Spanish scores.  
Predictably, CONAFE students had significantly higher repetition and failure rates than 
did non-CONAFE students. CONAFE appeared to decrease repetition rates by an average of 
0.13 percent per year, which represents an elimination of 6 percent of inequality in repetition 
rates between comparable CONAFE and non-CONAFE students. Overall, CONAFE decreased 
failure rates by 0.3 percent per year, but that effect was largest for the less-disadvantaged group.  
These results imply that the Mexican government’s provision of extra resources to 
particularly disadvantaged schools does result in measurable improvement in the learning of 
students in those schools. One should not draw from this result the conclusion that other   39
compensatory education will be equally effective. It may be that CONAFE’s decentralized 
spending and management structure, its involvement of parents in local decision-making, its 
targeting scheme, or other unique aspects of its design cause CONAFE to be effective, and that 
those design aspects are absent from other compensatory programs.  
  Furthermore, at this stage we are unable to determine precisely which of CONAFE’s 
interventions make it effective. Further research could help to draw lessons from CONAFE that 
would apply to similar programs in other countries. Therefore, future research using data on 
CONAFE support disaggregated by type of support should focus on determining what aspects of 
CONAFE’s interventions make CONAFE effective. That research would allow broader 
generalization of our results to other countries. 
  Future research could also focus on the long-term effects of CONAFE intervention. Early 
research on the Head Start program in the United States found that Head Start increased test 
scores and decreased dropout and failure rates. Later research on Head Start, however, found that 
it had insignificant effects on college enrollment and adulthood earnings. We use test scores and 
short-term dropout and failure data as predictors of total schooling and lifetime earnings. But 
since the purpose of compensatory education is to help people escape poverty, the most telling 
evaluation should consider not merely whether CONAFE increases test scores, but whether 
CONAFE improves outcomes 10-15 years after a student attends a CONAFE school. Although 
CONAFE has existed for over 30 years, such evaluation may require panel data that is currently 
unavailable. 
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